

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 30 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Research and Reports

FROM: [REDACTED]

A/MAR/RR

SUBJECT: Report on [REDACTED] Meeting of 27 November 1951

1. Following is a report on the principal issues discussed at the above meeting which was attended by: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (OPC), and myself.

2. [REDACTED] introduced the subject project and called upon me to explain in what manner ORR could support the project, as well as to describe ORR's organizational structure in the economic warfare field. I indicated that only a small staff of ORR was engaged in a study of economic warfare measures (principally those to be used by the U.S. against the Soviet bloc), and that a major share of ORR's work lay outside the field of strictly economic warfare matters. I stated that ORR was engaged in the production of a number of projects covering all aspects of the Soviet economy, and that possibly, certain of these projects would throw light on the proposed study.

3. [REDACTED] then explained his general hypothesis, stating that he hoped the compilation of a chronological list of apparently unrelated events might result in the establishment of a pattern of Soviet intentions. Such a chronology might perhaps uncover clues which could be used as a basis for further study.

4. [REDACTED] suggested it would be advisable to give special attention to the accumulation and analysis of information with respect to gold movements and fluctuations in the wool and cotton markets.

5. [REDACTED] although accepting in principle the validity of [REDACTED] hypothesis, raised the question as to whether it would not be more advantageous for professional experts within the Government to undertake this analysis. He argued that, although a preliminary survey could be made externally, that much of the material required for an accurate determination of Soviet intentions was available only to Government professionals. Pursuing his thesis, he reasoned that newspaper reports of, for example, strikes and airplane accidents, do not generally reveal the most significant details of any particular incident. Taking the case of an airplane accident, it would be the specialist within CAA who alone would be in a position to scrutinize all available information, classified and unclassified, including official investigation reports. [REDACTED] suggested, therefore, that it would be appropriate for the Economic Intelligence Committee to create a subcommittee to examine the potentialities of an inter-governmental survey on this proposed project.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

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FROM:



NO.

62584

DATE

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Operational Support for OPC

1. 25X1A9a [redacted] disturbed that he was not informed on this. Have gotten [redacted] 25X1A9a together on it.

2. This support could get much 25X1A9a bigger. [redacted] says 75% of OPC requests are for spot info that does not go through.

25X1A9a

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3. Operation support officers in divisions could handle both